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L Introduction
Perhaps surprisingly, the economic status of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
(LGB) people has been the subject of a hotly contested debate over the last
two decades. Generally speaking, one side argues that LGB people are
vulnerable to discrimination and lack important economic supports from the
state and from private third party actors. Another side contests that claim
by citing the results of marketing surveys finding high income levels for
LGB people and couples, which are said to imply that LGB people are not
in need of statutory protection against discrimination' or judicial protection
* M. V. Lee Badgett is a Professor of Economics and the Director of the Center for
Public Policy & Administration at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She is also
research director of the Williams Institute for Sexual Orientation Law and Public Policy at
the UCLA School of Law.
1. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 2238 Before
the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 103rd Cong. (1994) (testimony of Joseph
Broadus, Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law), available at 1994 WL 392911
(stating that homosexual households have an average income of $55,000 versus a national
average of $36,500 and thus do not need special civil rights legislation); see also Brave New
Schools: University Suspends Staffer over View of Homosexuality, WORLDNETDAILY, May
05, 2008, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageld=63459 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2008) (reporting an administrator's suspension for implying that being gay
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in the form of heightened scrutiny.2 Yet another side takes a more market-
oriented approach, citing marketing surveys as evidence of an affluent and
underappreciated market niche whose purchasing power will help them win
attention and equality.3
As both an observer and participant in this national debate, my
impression is that these debates and empirical claims were more hotly
contested in the 1990's than in the first eight years of this decade. In this
century so far, attention to LGB people as a market seems to have been
diluted by a heightened concern about the possibility of allowing same-sex
couples to marry. Economic reasoning plays an important role in this issue,
as well. Proponents of marriage equality point to the economic benefits of
marriage and argue that same-sex couples should have access to those
benefits.4 Opponents of marriage equality minimize the need for the equal
application of benefits to same-sex couples, even going so far as to argue
that such rights are linked to benefits that employers and governments can
ill afford.'
does not deserve the same protection as being black or handicapped) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
2. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-54 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a Colorado referendum prohibiting state or local governments from extending civil
rights protections to persons on the basis of sexual orientation only denied preferential
treatment to homosexuals and did not impinge on substantive rights); see also Jane
Schachter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate In The States: Decoding The Discourse Of
Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283, 317 n.144 (1994) (comparing calling
homosexuals affluent to anti-Asian American and anti-Semitic stereotypes).
3. See M. V. LEE BADGETIT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 20-51 (2003) (discussing the common misconception that
homosexuals are generally more affluent than their heterosexual counterparts).
4. See, e.g., EvAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND
GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MARRY 132-34 (2004) (arguing that homosexual unions should
receive the same economic benefits as heterosexual unions and citing Vermont as an
example).
5. See, e.g., Federal Marriage Amendment (The Musgrave Amendment): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 42
(2004) (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus) ("Won't this just break the bank?"); 142 CONG.
REC. S10110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (arguing the cost of
changing the definition of spouse). Byrd stated:
"Moreover, I urge my colleagues to think of the potential cost involved here.
How much is it going to cost the Federal Government if the definition of
,spouse' is changed? It is not a matter of irrelevancy at all. It is not a matter of
attacking anyone's personal beliefs or personal activity. That is not my purpose
here. What is the added cost in Medicare and Medicaid benefits if a new
meaning is suddenly given to these terms?
Id.; Tom Ramstack, Same-Sex "Marriage" Likely to Prove Costly, WASH. TIMEs, May 18,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.wash times.com/business/20040518-120217-1233r.htm
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In this Article, I argue that the two issues are linked by a common
trope-the double-edged sword that is often wielded in the course of public
policy debates. In one case, the double-edged quality of a seemingly
benign or even positive claim-that LGB people are relatively affluent-
has been noted in a variety of contexts to caution against using the image or
myth of affluence for fear of heightening resentment against the gay
community or for inflating the economic and political power of gay
people.6 The most persuasive argument against those empirical claims, in
my view, is not political utility or disutility but the mounting evidence from
a variety of data sources and authors that LGB people are simply not more
affluent than heterosexual people.7 In the next Part, I review the existing
empirical evidence on the relative incomes of LGB people and heterosexual
people.
In the other case, the issue of marriage rights for same-sex couples and
the claims that marriage is a double-edged sword have largely emerged
from a debate within the LGB community. These debates, based on
competing ideological arguments often rooted in feminism on both sides,
have warned that LGB people will lose as well as gain from marriage
equality.8 For instance, marriage dissidents in the community warn that the
movement to win marriage rights will divert resources from more important
issues.9 As this argument often goes, marriage also threatens community by
creating dangerous hierarchies within the LGB community, with "good"
married gay people favored within and outside the community over "bad"
unmarried gay people.' Worse yet, marriage threatens to draw LGB
(stating that public and private entities would end up paying for the financial benefits of
legalized same-sex marriage).
6. See, e.g., Thomas Soule, The Myth of Gay Affluence, THE ORANGE COUNTY
BLADE, at 13-17 (April 2006) (examining the pervasive myth that homosexuals are
generally more affluent than their heterosexual counterparts).
7. See id. at 14-15 (asserting that major studies showing that homosexuals have more
disposable income are unfairly biased).
8. See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLutM.
J. GENDER & L. 236, 246 ("[Marriage] exacts a dear price. As lesbigay people are herded
into a particular form of sociability-a narrow conception of family-we have lost an
interest in, if not now disavowed, other forms of sociality that a generation ago we
celebrated.").
9. See Wyatt Buchanan, Alternative to Same-Sex Unions, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 27,
2006, at A4 ("[Same sex marriage] is a limited goal, and to see that goal suck up all the
resources and money has been very concerning.").
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX PoLITCS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 41-80 (1999) (arguing against same-sex marriage as against societal
norms).
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people into the safety of home and hearth, fragmenting the political and
cultural possibilities of sexual dissidence.11
I am personally unconvinced that the dire warnings emerging from this
internal ideological battle within the LGB community are likely to occur,
although a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Even if such
outcomes should result, I would argue that they are the result of social,
political, and cultural forces other than winning the right to marry.'
2
However, the marriage dissidents also push us to consider carefully the
potential disadvantages of marriage seen in recent history, such as the
potential for domestic violence or the economically harmful specialization
in home work by women. I would argue, though, that such potential
disadvantages are already in the cultural and familial vocabularies of same-
sex couples who have grappled with the challenges of making ends meet
and raising children without the legal recognition of their same-sex
relationship.
Further, I would argue that the heat of the LGB community debate has
perhaps prevented shedding light on some of the actual potential
disadvantages of marriage for some couples in a material sense. After a
brief analysis of the double-edged economic sword in Part II, I turn to
marriage. Marriage, after all, is a status that comes with responsibilities as
well as rights, obligations as well as benefits. In Parts III through V of this
essay, I lay out the edgier side of marriage related to divorce (Part 1I),
public welfare benefits (Part IV), and income taxation (Part V )
I. Latest Evidence on the Economic Status of LGB People
On one level, being thought to have relatively high incomes might
seem like a positive characteristic, signifying workplace success and a
social position worthy of esteem, not stigma. Of course, stereotypes of high
incomes for Jewish families are a staple of anti-Semitism, demonstrating
that seemingly positive characteristics can trigger resentment and bigotry
rather than respect for accomplishment.'
3
Regardless of whether high incomes are or should be a mark of
productive and virtuous citizenship for LGB people, more than a decade of
11. See id. (noting that same-sex marriage is seen as a disservice to those same-sex
couples who choose to not marry).
12. See generally M. V. LEE BADGETr, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GEr MARRIED
(forthcoming).
13. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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published research in economics demonstrates that the claim of gay
affluence is more properly termed a myth. In my recent review of twelve
peer-reviewed studies of income differences between LGB people and
heterosexual people, I found no evidence of an extraordinary income
advantage for LGB people.
14
To the contrary, these studies showed that gay men earn significantly
less than do heterosexual men who have similar characteristics. The wage
gap is sizable in some studies and ranges from 13% to 32% lower earnings
for gay men after controlling for other influences on wages. 15 For instance,
men in gay couples earn $43,117 on average, or 13% less than married
men's average earnings of $49,777 in Census 2000.16
The picture is less clear-cut for lesbians, though. Lesbian and bisexual
women earn more than heterosexual women in the studies reviewed, with
17
the difference reaching as high as a 31% income advantage for lesbians.
Some, but not all, of that difference results from higher hours and weeks
worked by lesbians. 18 The other reasons for the higher earnings remain
unclear, 19 but could result from lesbians' greater attachment to and
experience in the paid labor force. 20 But that apparent advantage disappears
14. See generally M. V. Lee Badgett, Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation: A
Review of the Economics in Literature and Beyond, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF DISCR INATION 161 (William M. Rodgers III ed., 2006).
15. See id. at 169-71 (reviewing twelve peer-reviewed studies on earnings differences
based on sexual orientation). This range is based on ten of the reviewed studies that used
data from the United States. Id. Only two of these studies reported a negative earnings gap
for gay men that equaled less than 13%. Id. One study found that gay men earned 2.4% less
than unmarried, partnered heterosexual men. Id. at 170. The same study, though, found that
gay men earned 14.4% less than married heterosexual men. Id.
16. ADAM P. ROMERO ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., CENSUS SNAPSHOT: UNITED
STATES 2 (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/Williamsinstitute/publications/
USCensusSnapshot.pdf.
17. See Badgett, supra note 14, at 170-71, 174-75 (discussing nine studies using data
from the United States). Only one of the reviewed studies showed a negative correlation
between being a lesbian and earnings. Id. at 174. Two other studies showed no difference
between the earnings of lesbian and heterosexual women. Id. The rest of the studies showed
that lesbians earn more than heterosexual women, with differences in the estimates varying
on the behavioral timeframe used to classify sexual orientation. Id.
18. Id. at 177.
19. See id. (explaining that most hypotheses for lesbians' higher earnings cannot be
tested with existing data).
20. See M. V. LEE BADGETr ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE:
CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 14
(2007) (positing that lesbians may make different career choices based on their lower
likelihood of marrying men-who on average have higher wages-or of delaying their
careers to have children, thereby investing more in training or experience), available at
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when comparing a lesbian couple to a heterosexual couple. 21 Two women's
incomes are significantly less than the incomes of heterosexual couples
(and gay male couples, for that matter).22 Taken as a whole, the evidence
suggests that lesbians' economic resources appear to be shaped more
directly by their gender than their sexual orientation. 3
Other evidence adds to the case for seeing LGB people as subject to
economic disadvantage overall. A recent review of studies of
discrimination found that many LGB people report having experienced
discrimination.24 A survey of a random sample of LGB Americans in 2006
found that 7% of LGB people overall, approximately 9% of gay men, and
approximately 13% of lesbians said their sexual orientation had led to their
being fired or denied a job.25 This vulnerability might well be reflected in
the lower earnings for gay men as well as the more direct reports of
discrimination.26
Taking compensation as including both wages and fringe benefits
reveals another realm of discrimination. Most firms that offer health care
benefits to employees and to spouses of employees do not similarly cover
the same-sex domestic partners of employees.27 Indeed, less than a quarter
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/Bias%20in%20the%2OWorkplace.pdf.
21. See BADGE'T, supra note 3, at 119 (summarizing findings based on the 1990
Census data that gay male couples earn $58,366, lesbian couples earn $45,166 per year, and
heterosexual married couples earn $47,193).
22. Id.
23. See BADGETr, supra note 20, at 12-13 (explaining that it seems "that gender
discrimination has a greater impact on lesbians' wages than sexual orientation
discrimination").
24. See id. at 2-6 (summarizing five academic reviews of studies on sexual orientation
discrimination, three recent surveys based on national probability samples, two other
national studies based on non-random samples, eight studies of sexual orientation
discrimination in particular geographic areas, and several studies of such discrimination in
particular occupations).
25. See Gregory M. Herek, Hate Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual
Minority Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates from a National Probability
Sample, 24 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 13), available at
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/ Herek_2007jIVpreprint. pdf.
26. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 36-37 (discussing reasons why gay and bisexual
men appear to face sexual orientation discrimination to a greater extent than lesbian and
bisexual women). Some employers may discriminate against gay men as a proxy for
discrimination based on HIV status, as cases of HIV among lesbians are much rarer. Id. at
37. The income difference between gay and bisexual men and women may stem from
heterosexual men's more negative attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians. Id. Or
discrimination against women might not be detectable because of the lack of data to assess
the actual level of labor market experience for lesbians versus heterosexual women.
27. See THE KAISER FAMILY FouND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLoYER
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of employers provide such benefits,28 which can be worth $3000 to $4000
in employer payments. 29 And, to add insult to injury, even when employers
offer domestic partner benefits, the IRS considers those benefits to be
taxable income,30 adding over $1000 to the tax bill of the average employee
with a covered domestic partner.3 '
Given this context, it would seem that there is little to be gained by
denying the economic realities of gay and lesbian life, realities that could be
addressed by legislation outlawing employment and compensation
discrimination. 32  Nevertheless, some marketers insist on promoting
unsupportable claims about the high incomes earned and spent by the
typical gay man or lesbian as a way to attract corporate advertising
dollars. 33 That tension will undoubtedly persist as long as gay people-and
especially well-off gay people-become increasingly visible.34
The new wave of policy attention is now more focused on issues of
relationship recognition, where issues of gay economic status have shifted
HEALTH BENEFITS 40 (2008), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf (finding that 34%
of all firms offering health benefits do not offer them to unmarried same-sex domestic
partners and that 44% of firms have no policy on the issue).
28. Id.
29. See M.V. LEE BADGET', THE WILLIAMS INST., UNEQUAL TAXES ON EQUAL
BENEFITS: THE TAXATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS 6 (2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/domesticpartners.pdf (finding that an
employee adding a domestic partner with no children would add approximately $3,027 in
implied income from the employer and that an employee adding a domestic partner and
children would equal approximately $4068 in implied income from the employer).
30. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 118113-99 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0108010.pdf (explaining the Internal Revenue Service's
position on the taxation of domestic partners' health care benefits). The letter explains the
Internal Revenue Service's position that health coverage provided to a domestic partner
counts as taxable income. Id. at 11., , However, the letter notes the Internal Revenue
Service's position that health coverage provided to non-dependent domestic partner is not
taxable. Id.
31. BADGETI, supra note 29, at 7.
32. See BADGETT, supra note 3, at 46 (explaining that discrimination makes little
economic sense from the perspective of an employer, given that gay people's lower earnings
and economic vulnerability are not due to differences in ability or performance).
33. See id. at 127 (noting that "some marketers are more defensive and even secretive
about their use of statistics" and carelessly promote "an unsupportable stereotype about the
entire population of lesbians and gay men").
34. See id. at 126 (reasoning that advertisers will maintain their interest in the gay
consumer market as its attractiveness "appears to be tied to identifying the usual source of
marketing success for leisure products: consumers who have the right education, race, sex,
and household structure to accumulate buying power for the kind of products that rely on
high levels of discretionary income").
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away from the incomes of gay individuals to concerns about the economic
disadvantages faced by gay couples when they cannot marry.35 But even
there, a double-edged sword returns.
III. Divorce
When I talk to heterosexual friends about the issue of gay marriage,
occasionally one will add a cautionary tale of the "be careful what you wish
for" variety, pointing out the very real likelihood that many gay marriages
will end in divorce.36 Divorce is the counterbalancing edge of marriage, not
because marriages by same-sex couples will end, but because there are
often economic winners and losers in the process of divorce.37 Although I
will return to the issue of winners and losers shortly, I first want to argue
that the ability to divorce is one of the benefits of marriage, at least from a
Rawlsian sort of perspective in which one would not know in advance
whether one would be the winner or the loser.
The fact is that every marriage ends. 38 The two possible endings to
marriages--death and divorce-are about equally likely in the United
States.39  Because marriages end, someone needs to decide how assets,
income, and debts will be distributed.4° Since people entering marriages
35. See id. at 133 (explaining that the thought of gay people making choices in raising
children and in entering committed relationships rarely entered the minds of heterosexual
Americans until in the 1990s, when "family concerns surged to the top of the list of hotly
debated political issues related to lesbian and gay Americans").
36. See ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996 16 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002
pubs/p70-80.pdf (estimating the lifetime probability of divorce from first marriages in men
at age 25 in 1996 at 53% and the lifetime probability of divorce from first marriage in
women at age 25 in 1996 at 52%).
37. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents: Or, VI Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 285-87, 289 (1987) (proffering an example of the
winner or loser scenario). Cohen argues that as a woman's value to her husband-measured
by the value of her housework relative to her husband's increasing income and by her
physical attractiveness-declines over time, her husband has an increasing incentive to exit
the marriage in order to capture for himself the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits that he
otherwise would have conferred on her had he stayed in the marriage. Id.
38. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 197-251 (1989) (reviewing the
legal effects of the two possible endings of marriages-death and divorce).
39. KREIDER & FIELDS, supra note 36, at 16.
40. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 110 (explaining that the "law governing family
support obligations and family property has, for the most part, been developed for situations
of crisis, such as death, divorce, separation, or insolvency").
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may not want to think about or plan for that ending, the state in essence
does the planning for them through the legal institution of marriage.4
Marriage itself comes with a default set of rules for crises in relationships,
including division of property and the possibility of alimony, should the
relationship end in divorce.42 For most couples, the marriage contract only
needs legal enforcement when it ends.43
The rules for divorce will have important implications for the
economic well-being of the spouses during and after a marriage. Because
heterosexual married women sometimes give up or reduce their own wage-
earning and the possibility of investments in training that would increase
their earning capacity over time, women would need some kind of legal
claim on the family's assets and the husband's income to avoid destitution
should the relationship end in divorce. 44 Without such a claim, specializing
in household work, including child care, would be too risky;45 even with
41. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 208 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 69 (1996)) (asserting that "[o]ne key function of marriage is to
give couples. . .'off-the-rack rules' for situations that families might not anticipate, as when
a relationship ends from the death of one party or by divorce").
42. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 110 (describing default legal consequences of
divorce).
43. See BADGETT, supra note 3, at 198 (concluding that, based on the development of
law governing family support obligations and property, "obligations [like marriage
contracts] are commonly subject to direct state regulation only in case of a family crisis,
such as death, separation, divorce, or insolvency").
44. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 233-34 (explaining the current economic
presumptions of individuals involved in marriage and divorce). Glendon notes that:
support law, like modern divorce law, now presupposes a partnership of two
equal individuals who may have been economically interdependent in marriage,
but who are at least potentially independent upon divorce... [but i]f one of the
spouses is not in a position to provide for her own needs immediately, the role of
support law is increasingly seen as that of temporarily aiding in the transition to
self-sufficiency.
Id. However, the trend in "rules governing post-divorce spousal maintenance insist on
treating as exceptional the cases which are in fact the most common-those where a spouse's
potential for economic independence has been or is currently being compromised by the time
he or she has devoted to child care." Id. at 233. Spousal support after divorce is relatively
infrequent everywhere. Id.
45. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 160 (explaining that the promises in marriage to
deliver spousal services protect a man or a woman who gives up opportunities to develop
skills useful in other kinds of work in order to focus his or her skill development in the
home). Marriage promotes specialization in home production that otherwise would have
been "too risky for someone who might later in life have to take on both home production
responsibilities and a wage-paying job in the labor market." Id. When marriage ends,
instruments "like alimony, property division, and child support offer compensation to
someone who has given up opportunities in other economically necessary roles." Id.
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that claim, women are at economic risk in a divorce. 46 In fact, some
economists have pointed out that men might have a very explicit incentive
to divorce their wives as the wives age and are less productive in the home
once children have grown up. 4 7 Spousal support (alimony) and equitable
property division are wives' (and sometimes husbands') claims on the
accumulation of family goods and the husband's earning capacity that the
wife contributed to in the economic partnership of marriage.48 In theories
of family bargaining, these divorce rules also shape and potentially enhance
the relative bargaining power of women within functioning marriages.
49
Although the organization of families and their division of labor
appear to differ on average for same-sex couples when compared with
heterosexual couples, 50 the value of divorce is likely to be similar for same-
sex partners. Consider the difference between a divorce settlement when a
marriage ends and the division of property when a non-recognized and non-
formalized relationship ends. In good times, an intact couple that buys a
nice house, enjoys a healthy combined income, sits on a comfortable
savings account or pension, and drives two late model cars looks pretty
much the same economically whether married or unmarried. If the couple
is married and the marriage ends, the division of property acquired during
the marriage may be overseen by a judge who will apply the law to divide
the property equally or equitably, and the judge could impose alimony on
the higher earning partner.5'
46. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 217 (1986)
(asserting that the advent of no-fault divorce has led judges to increasingly deny long-term
continuing support to divorced women based on the rationale that society has entered an era
where women have chosen independence); see also Rand W. Ressler & Melissa S. Waters,
Female Earnings and the Divorce Rate, 32 APPLIED ECON. 1889, 1892-96 (2000) (finding
an empirical relationship between women's divorce probability and wages, in which the
probability of divorce increases earnings and higher earnings increases the likelihood of
divorce).
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 160 (observing that alimony, property division, and
child compensation offer at least partial compensation to a person who has contributed to the
household instead of pursuing other economic opportunities).
49. See Martin Zelder, For Better or for Worse? Is Bargaining in Marriage
Efficient?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 157, 161-67 (Antony
W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002) (explaining economic models' predictions of
spousal behavior in marriage and divorce based on divorce rules).
50. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 133-70 (comparing gay and heterosexual family
structures).
51. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 199-233 (surveying the divorce laws of England,
France, West Germany, Sweden, and the United States). Obviously the rules for division
will vary from country to country and, in the United States, from state to state. Id. But
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If the relationship with no legal status ends, however, a judge might
only divide up the property based on an explicit agreement between the two
partners or based on who legally owns the property--e.g. she who pays for
the sofa, keeps the sofa.52 It seems quite likely that a poorer spouse will do
better than a poorer unmarried partner in claiming a portion of the property
that the couple acquired and shared while together, unless the poorer
partner had signed a cohabitation contract that specified a divorce-like
division of assets (or unless the poorer spouse had signed a prenuptial
agreement that favored the richer spouse).53
Since the division of family assets in a divorce is a zero-sum game, the
double-edged sword emerges for at least one member of a married same-
sex couple (or a couple with a legal status that requires the equivalent of a
divorce to dissolve the relationship).54 One member of the same-sex couple
might walk away with more after the end of a marriage than from the end of
an unmarried relationship, but the other partner would necessarily do worse.
While no systematic studies have been conducted to measure the
relative individual gains from ending a legally recognized relationship
rather than an unrecognized one, anecdotal evidence suggests the impact is
more than simply hypothetical. One friend of mine is convinced (and
grateful) that the settlement she got when divorcing her higher earning
female partner was much higher simply because their relationship was
legally recognized and subject to the state law of divorce. In contrast,
another friend recently complained to me about the possibility of his
needing to pay alimony to his younger, lower-earning male former partner
as a result of the same law that had benefited my other friend.
most Western European countries apply principles of equity when dividing marital property,
although the property to be divided may be defined differently. See id. at 208 (noting that in
France, assets acquired by gainful activity during the marriage are normally divided equally
between husband and wife in the absence of an alternative arrangement negotiated by
marital contract or divorce settlement, whereas in the United States, the courts have broad
discretion to redistribute all of the spouses' property).
52. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 199 (explaining that courts have ruled on the
division of property of cohabiting, unmarried opposite-sex couples, basing their decisions on
explicit and implicit agreements by the members of the couple).
53. See IRVING J. SLOAN, LIVING TOGErHER: UNMARRIEDS AND THE LAW 4-5 (1980)
(stating that a nonmarital partner does not have an interest in the property accumulated
during the relationship, thus denied of such reasonable and equitable consideration where no
agreement to share is present).
54. See Lee Romney, Though They Can't Wed, Gays May Now Divorce, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at Al (explaining that under the rights and obligations of marriage, a partner is
liable for the other's debt, while earned income of both partners is community property that
will be equally divided upon dissolution).
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Intriguingly, we also have other evidence that is consistent with the
hypothesis that some same-sex couples are conscious of the rules of divorce
and, perhaps, of the potential personal downside.55  California adopted a
"domestic partnership" status in 1999 that gave partners about 16 rights,
including hospital visitation rights and the right for public employers to
offer partner benefits.56 The benefits were later expanded somewhat, and
then in 2003, the state legislature passed a second expansion that applied
almost all of the state rights and responsibilities of marriage-including the
principle of community property and the laws of divorce-to domestic
partners as of January 1, 2005.57 Recognizing that couples registering
under the old rules would not necessarily want a more comprehensive
status, the state sent letters notifying existing partners of the changes to give
them a chance to use the old, easier dissolution process that involved
sending in a simple form.58 Dissolutions of partnerships went from roughly
10 to 30 per month to 100 to 200 per month until December 2004.59 In the
last month before the new law took effect, almost 1200 couples dissolved
their legal domestic partnerships.6° The rate of dissolution went from 1-2%
of existing partnerships in 2000-2002 to 3% in 2003 and almost 9% in
2004.61
.55. See GRACE BLUMBERG, UCLA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FIVE: CALIFORNIA'S
ADOPTION OF STRONG DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP LEGISLATION FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 5
(2006), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclaspa/cpo/5 (suggesting the desire for an
easy exit as a possible explanation for a relatively small percentage of same-sex couples
registering for domestic partnership when made available, while those unregistered couples
claimed the rights and benefits of marriage without assuming the reciprocal obligation).
56. See generally Domestic Partners Act, ch. 588, 1999 Cal. Stat. 3372 (1999) (current
version at CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. §297.5 (West 2008)).
57. See Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stat.
2586, pmbl. (2003) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. §297.5 (West 2008)) ("This
bill would extend the rights and duties of marriage to persons registered as domestic partners
on and after January 1, 2005.").
58. See Press Release, California Department of Child Support Services, The
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act (Aug. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.childsup.cahwnet.gov/Portals/ /resources/docs/policy/css/2006/cssO6-29.pdf
(stating that new extended rights and responsibilities will be automatically applied to all
registered domestic partners, therefore the California Secretary of State is required to notify
and allow an opportunity for the registered domestic partners to dissolve the partnership if
they did not wish to accept the extended rights and responsibilities).
59. See M. V. LEE BADGETr ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., MARRIAGE, REGISTRATION
AND DISSOLUTION BY SAME SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. 15, fig. 9 (2008), available at
http://www.totalmerrill.compublish/mkt/pdfs/FinalCouplesCount.pdf (illustrating monthly
dissolution rate of domestic partnerships in California in 2004).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 16, fig. 10 (illustrating the annual percentage rate of dissolution for
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What does this spike in dissolutions tell us? It seems unlikely that
thousands of unhappy couples did not get around to ending their legal
relationships until just before the law changed, since dissolutions were quite
easy to accomplish until January 1, 2005.62 In fact, some anecdotal
evidence reported in the news media suggests that the dissolved domestic
partner relationships continued to exist and only the legal status was
dispensed with.63  Some couples might have dissolved domestic
partnerships out of the fear that their tax situations would have been
burdened or complicated if they remained domestic partners.64 Equally
likely is the possibility that couples did not want to share property,
earnings, or debt.65 I would hypothesize that wealthy gay men and lesbians,
in particular, were reluctant to give their partners an equal share of assets
and income as community property or to allow for the possibility of
alimony for their partners. Anecdotal evidence related to me by
Sacramento insiders suggests that some wealthy gay people did, in fact,
oppose this part of the new law.
How much will the prospect of divorce matter to LGB people, and will
it influence their marriage decisions and economic well-being? Given the
potential economic advantages of marriage, along with widespread over-
confidence that one's own marriage will not end in divorce, the possible
downside for one partner might be thought to make little difference.
Certainly, in the United States, alimony is relatively rare and not
particularly generous, reducing a richer partner's risk (but also raising the
poorer partner's risk).66 Couples might also choose to contract out of some
same-sex couples in California from 2000 to 2006).
62. See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS-EQUALITY CALIFORNIA, THE
CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP LAW: WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY 7
(2007), available at http://www.ncrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue relationship
Recognitiondocs Downloads (stating that registered domestic partners can terminate their
relationships before January 1, 2005 simply by mailing in a form to the Secretary of State's
office).
63. See Romney, supra note 54, at Al (stating that, although an increased number of
same-sex couples got off the domestic partnership registry as their burdens were increased
by the new California law, at least some of those couples maintained their relationship).
64. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 102170-06, 2 (Feb. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.treas.gov/foiallists/0,,id--97705,00.html (advising that domestic partners
should report as taxable income only that income earned individually-not half of the
couple's combined income).
65. See BLUMBERG, supra note 55, at 134 (indicating that while unregistered same-sex
couples claim the rights and benefits of marriage, they in effect decline to assume the
reciprocal obligation).
66. See Yoram Weiss & Robert Willis, Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Evidence
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of the divorce obligations in prenuptial agreements. Like many of the
issues raised in this Part, the size and prevalence of the negative economic
effects of divorce for some individuals is an empirical question awaiting
researchers' attention. Either way, though, the gains and losses come in a
zero-sum game, with one partner winning and one losing. Marriage matters
more in determining which one is the winner or loser, not whether one loses
or wins.
IV. Public Welfare Benefits and Poverty
A second possible downside of marriage comes when assessing the
responsibilities of marriage in addition to the rights and benefits. In most
states, marriage involves an obligation of mutual support between couples,
creating a private economic bond that undergirds the remaining economic
supports of public programs for income assistance and health care.6 7 Nancy
Polikoff points out that Maryland, Michigan, and Florida no longer have
such a requirement,68 but clearly those states are in the minority.
One direct impact of this obligation on families comes in the eligibility
criteria for many public assistance programs. Federally supported programs
such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income,
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and Medicaid involve
calculations of family income that usually only include the income of the
applicant and his or her spouse.69 As a result of these eligibility criteria,
and Interpretation, 11 U. CHI. J. OF LABOR ECON. 629, 629-31 (1993) (discussing how in
one study of white couples, about two-thirds of divorcing couples split property fifty-fifty,
but husbands paid alimony to wives in only 6% of divorces); see also TIMOTHY S. GRALL,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 1-3 (2005) (indicating that recent
U.S. data from 2001-02 suggests that the median level of support provided to spouses or ex-
spouses outside the household is $6,000 per year, and few receive any at all); Pamela J.
Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital Disruption for Young Women Over the Past Two
Decades, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 353, 353-54 (1993) (stating that a large body of research shows
that women are often much worse off than men after heterosexual divorces).
67. See NANcY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 126-28 (2008)
(demonstrating the relationship between being married and obligations and rights, including
health care, medical services, Social Security retirement benefits, and family expenses
extending to the support of children and spouse).
68. Id. at 127 ("Maryland, Michigan, and Florida have abolished the necessaries
doctrine.").
69. Compare The Marriage Calculator: Financial Consequences of Marriage
Decisions: Database of State Policies Affecting Marriage in Respect to Cohabitors,
http://marriagecalculator.acf.hhs.gov/marriage/ddlDD3.php, with Database of State Policies
Affecting Marriage, http://marriagecalculator.acf.hhs.gov/marriagetdd/dd_2.php?prog=l
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allowing same-sex couples to marry would mean that a lesbian or gay
applicant's new spouse's income and assets would become part of an
eligibility calculation, but a same-sex unmarried partner's income and
assets would not. (Marriage might also mean that a family would be less
likely to need or seek public assistance, for instance if a partner's employer
provided spousal and family health insurance coverage that meant Medicaid
or SCHIP would no longer be necessary.) Thus marriage could mean that
some individuals in same-sex couples would lose out on benefits that they
now receive.
My colleagues and I have assessed this effect in a series of studies on
the fiscal impact of marriage equality for gay couples in several states.7° In
each of those states, we found that state spending on public assistance
would drop considerably if same-sex couples were allowed to marry or to
enter civil unions.
Another study using Census 2000 provides further support for this
claim that unmarried same-sex couples are currently more likely to qualify
for welfare benefits and SSI than are married couples. In that ongoing
study of poverty in the gay community, my co-authors and I are finding that
people in same-sex couples whose incomes place them below the poverty
level are more likely to be receiving income from public assistance than are
(illustrating that in a few cases, states have opted to include the income of a cohabiting
unmarried partner, though no states treat people with same-sex partners in that way).
According to the Administration for Children and Families, United States Department of
Health and Human Services, the States of California, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wyoming will take a cohabiting boyfriend's household contributions into
account when assessing a woman's eligibility and benefit levels. Id.
70. See generally M. V. Lee Badgett et al., Supporting Families, Saving Funds: An
Economic Analysis of Equality for Same-Sex Couples in New Jersey, 4 RUrGER J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (2006); M. V. Lee Badgett & R. Bradley Sears, Putting a Price on Equality? The
Impact of Allowing Same-Sex Couples to Marry on California's Budget, 16 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 197 197-232 (2005); M. V. LEE BADGET" ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., THE
IMPACT ON IOWA'S BUDGET OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY (2008); M. V. LEE
BADGETIr ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT ON OREGON'S BUDGET OF INTRODUCING
SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2008); M. V. LEE BADGETT ET AL, THE WILLIAMS INST.,
THE IMPACT ON MARYLAND'S BUDGET OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY (2007);
M. V. LEE BADGETr ET AL, THE WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT OF THE COLORADO DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP ACT ON COLORADO'S STATE BUDGET (2006); M. V. LEE BADGETT & GARY J.
GATES, THE WILLIAMS INST., THE EFFECT OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP ON BUSINESS AND THE ECONOMY (2006); M. V. LEE BADGETr Er AL., THE
WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT ON WASHINGTON'S BUDGET OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES
TO MARRY (2006); M. V. LEE BADGETr Er AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT ON NEW
MEXICO'S BUDGET OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY (2006); M. V. LEE
BADGET'" Er AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., COUNTING ON COUPLES: FISCAL SAVINGS FROM
ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES IN CONNECTICUT TO MARRY (2005).
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comparable, married, different-sex couples below the poverty level.
Marriage-and full federal recognition of those marriages-would mean
that same-sex couples would lose that advantage.
V. Income Taxation: the Marriage Penalty
Having access to income tax advantages given to married couples is
one reason that some same-sex couples might wish to marry. 71 To be sure,
there are several important income tax advantages that come with marriage.
As noted earlier, the value of employer-provided health insurance benefits
is not subject to income taxation, while imputed income based on the value
of domestic partner benefits is taxable.72 The differential tax treatment of
health care benefits for married couples would be worth more than $1000
per year in federal income taxes for a typical unmarried couple, and usually
even more when state income taxes are taken into account.73 In addition,
married couples can more easily list each other as a dependent on tax
forms.74 Married filers may receive preferential treatment with respect to
deductions or exemptions that are higher than for single filers or can be
shared in ways that benefit the couple.75
Same-sex couples might even pay less in taxes if they were allowed to
marry.76 A couple in which one partner has very low or no income and the
other has a much higher income might well pay less in federal taxes. This
marriage benefit results because of "income splitting. 77 In a sense, each
71. See I.R.S. Publication 501, 5 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p501.pdf ("[By] fil[ing] a joint return, your tax may be lower than your combined tax for
the other filing statuses. Also, your standard deduction may be higher, and you may qualify
for tax benefits that do not apply to other filing statuses.").
72. See Badgett, supra note 29, at 1, 3-5 (indicating that, while spousal health benefits
are exempt from taxation, health benefits provided to all domestic partners are taxed as
income to the employee).
73. See id. at 6-8 (stating that the health coverage taxed as income to domestic
partners creates an extra tax averaging $1,069 per year).
74. See id. at 9 (stating that "to qualify as a dependent of a taxpayer, a domestic
partner would have to live all year in the taxpayer's household, receive more than half of his
or her support from the taxpayer, and meet the IRS citizenship/residency test").
75. See James Am et al., Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of
Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, 2 Nat. Tax J. 201, 204 n.9 (2000) (noting that the
Congressional Budget Office has found that 51% of marriages enjoy a tax subsidy).
76. See id. at 203--04 (explaining that "income splitting" provides an opportunity to
save money when one partner earns less than the other).
77. See id. at 203 (explaining that "[m]arried couples effectively split their income on
tax returns. If two people marry and one of them has zero income, income splitting means
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spouse is paying taxes on the average income for the couple, which means
that the income might be taxed at a lower marginal rate when tax rates are
progressive.78 In other words, a couple earning $80,000 a year in taxable
income will pay less in taxes than the combined taxes of one person earning
$75,000 per year and one person earning $5,000 per year.
What about the other married couples? They constitute the other edge
of the tax sword, paying more in taxes as married couples than they would
if both were single.79  The paradigmatic case is when two earners have
fairly similar earnings.80 For instance, two single people earning $75,000
per year in taxable income would each pay taxes of 10% on income up to
$8,025, 15% on the next $24,525 in income (that is, up to $32,550), and
25% on the next $42,450 in income. If married, however, their $150,000 in
combined taxable income would push them into the 28% tax bracket,
increasing their taxes as a married couple when compared with two single
individuals.
This well-known marriage penalty in the federal tax laws is likely to
be a particular concern for same-sex couples if they were allowed to marry
and to be treated as married by the tax code.81  (Same-sex couples in
Massachusetts and Connecticut can marry but are not treated as married
under federal tax law because of the Defense of Marriage Act.) 82  The
incomes of same-sex couples are closer together than those of different-sex
unmarried couples, suggesting that more same-sex couples would be
subject to the marriage penalty, although the difference in incomes within
couples is fairly large for both groups.83 In Census 2000, the income gap
that the individual with some income moves into a lower marginal tax bracket as a result of
the marriage, so that the marriage reduces the combined tax burdens of the two partners").
78. See id. at 203-04 (explaining that the lower tax is not written into the tax code,
rather it "emerges because of the combination of progressive marginal tax rates and the
family as the unit of taxation").
79. See Aim et al., supra note 75, at 204 (stating that though a subsidy for some
married couples exists, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 also created a widespread marriage
penalty as well).
80. See id. (stating that "when people with similar earnings marry, their combined
income pushes the couple into higher tax brackets than they face as singles, and they pay
correspondingly higher taxes with marriage").
81. See id. at 213 (concluding that if same-sex couples were allowed to marry, it
would generate between $300 million and $1.3 billion in additional federal income tax
revenue).
82. See Defense of Marriage Act 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000) (defining marriage between one
man and one woman for any Act passed by Congress regardless of what individual states
decide on the matter).
83. See Romero et al., supra note 16, at tbl. 3 (showing that the income gap between
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between partners was $26,131 for same-sex couples compared with
$29,626 for married different-sex couples.' Same-sex couples with
children might also see their income taxes rise because one parent filing as
head of household would have paid lower taxes than for a single individual,
reducing the couple's total taxes in the unmarried state. 5 Marriage would
create the need to file as married, increasing the likelihood that the couple
would pay higher tax rates on some income.86
The net effect of the double-edged tax sword could easily be that
marriage would raise income taxes paid by people in same-sex couples.
Indeed, two studies at the federal level have concluded that same-sex
couples would, as a group, pay more in taxes if married than single, thus
raising income tax revenue by somewhere between $400 million and $1
billion.87
Some states also have significant tax penalties resulting from a
combination of progressive tax rates, favorable head-of-household filing
statuses, and sharing of spousal exemptions and credits. In the series of
state-level studies mentioned earlier, my colleagues and I have simulated
the impact of filing as married for same-sex couples using simulations with
Census 2000 data. We found that net state income taxes would rise for as
many as three-quarters of same-sex couples if they married. (See Table 1,
below).
Clearly for families in this situation, as for those who will lose
eligibility for public assistance as outlined in the previous Part, there are
financial disincentives to marry. The research on marriage and welfare
provision for different-sex couples has found only a relatively small impact
of these disincentives on the actual decisions about marriage, however.88
same-sex partners is $26,131 and $29,626 between married couples).
84. Id. at3.
85. See Aim et al., supra note 75, at 212 (explaining that when single, an individual
who claims a child as head-of-household retains a "preferential tax schedule and standard
deduction relative to those for single individuals").
86. See id. at 212 (indicating that the tax deductions single parents receive from their
children will be minimized if that parent marries).
87. See id. at 212 (stating that legalizing same-sex marriage in the most likely
statistical scenario will lead to an annual federal income tax increase of $1 billion); see also
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 2 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/
doc5559/06-21-SameSexMarriage.pdf (stating that from the years 2005-10, legalizing same-
sex marriage would have a federal revenue increase of $400 million). The CBO study's
difference in findings likely reflects changes in the tax code designed to reduce the marriage
penalty.
88. See James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of
GAY ECONOMIC LIFE
Perhaps that small disincentive effect is the result of other financial
advantages from marriage. Furthermore, anthropologists and other social
scientists have found that the decision to marry or enter a committed
relationship has symbolic value that may not be outweighed by economic
disadvantages. 89
Table 1: Changes in state income taxes when same-sex couples marry
State % whose taxes % whose taxes % whose taxes
increase decrease don't change
California 11% 54% 35%
Connecticut 49% 39% 12%
Maryland 22% 75% 3%
Massachusetts 44% 13% 43%
New Jersey 58% 36% 6%
New Mexico 46% 46% 8%
Oregon 75% 23% 2%
VI. Concluding Thoughts
In using the same rhetorical trope of the double-edged sword to refer
to common concerns about the economic status of LGB people and to less
common concerns about marriage, I do not mean to argue that the two
situations are precisely parallel. Nor do I mean to argue that we should
both avoid blanket assertions that the gay community is wealthy and avoid
pushing for the right of same-sex couples to marry.
Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 EcONOMICA 297, 309-10 (1999) (stating that though the
marriage penalty tends to effect women's decisions to marry more than men, there tends not
to be a statistical relationship between tax rates and the decision to marry); see also Robert
Moffitt, Incentive Effects in the U.S. Welfare System, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 57 (1992) ("The
econometric studies show that labor supply is reduced by the AFDC and Food Stamp
programs, that higher potential benefits induce greater participation in these programs, and
that the programs affect family structure though usually weakly."); Rebecca M. Blank,
Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, 40 J. ECON. Lrr. 1105, 1158 (2002)
(indicating that study results regarding the role of state welfare systems in an individual's
decision to marry are inconclusive, though single mothers participating in the Minnesota
Family Investment Program married at much higher rates).
89. See ELLEN LEwIN, RECOGNIZING OURSELVES: CEREMONIES OF LESBIAN AND GAY
COMMITMENT 250 (1998) (considering the symbolic nature of marriage and concluding that
the choice to marry is really about the couple's relationship to its families); SUZANNE
SHERMAN, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 101
(Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992) (quoting one couple's reason for marrying as "creating our
family").
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The two double-edged swords for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
community outlined in this paper-the stereotype of gay affluence and the
possibility of marriage equality-are quite different in one important way.90
The actual existence of affluent LGB individuals would be the situation
most analogous to the real potential economic disadvantage of marriage for
some LGB people or couples. However, my argument is that the
undeniable fact of affluence for some LGB people is not the issue. My
concern is the widespread application of the image of affluence to the
whole LGB community when the credible data suggests that LGB people
are spread out along the income distribution just as heterosexual people are
spread out economically. 9' The stereotype used to characterize an entire
group is the problem, both empirically and politically, not the reality that
some LGB individuals happen to be wealthy.
In the case of marriage, the economic double-edged sword is really
more like a scalpel, picking out certain individuals or couples for some
disadvantage related to divorce, taxation, or public assistance.92 Rather than
having a community-wide effect, the potential disadvantages are more
personal and customized when they exist. The value of thinking about
marriage in this way is also probably most obvious at a more personal level.
Most gay people marrying in Massachusetts, for instance, have not been
married before and might not realize the full implications of their choice to
marry. 93 Rather than be surprised at tax time, same-sex couples would be
better off understanding any financial trade-offs they might be making
before they walk down the aisle.
90. See BADGETT, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that the stereotype of affluent LGB
people has been pervasive throughout society, going back to Roman times and reinforced by
the visibility of affluent and elite gay individuals such as Oscar Wilde and Gertrude Stein).
91. See BADGETr, supra note 3, at 118 (stating that "overall the more reliable
household figures suggest that gay households are not more affluent than heterosexual
households").
92. See Ressler & Waters, supra note 46, at 32 (stating that women tend to be the
financial losers in a divorce); Alm et al., supra note 75, at 204 (stating that, though the
subsidy for some married couples existed, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 created a widespread
marriage penalty as well, affecting those couples with similar income more than those with
one high income earner and one low income earner). Federally supported programs such as
Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income, SCHIP, and Medicaid
involve calculations of family income that usually only includes the income of the applicant
and his or her spouse.
93. See BADGET'r ET AL., supra note 59, at 10, available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/
williamsinstitute/ publications/Couples%20Marr%20Regis%2ODiss.pdf (stating only 11% of
males and 18% of females have been previously married).
